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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when 
one attains the state-defined age of majority.  Minors, as well as adults, are 
protected by the Constitution and possess Constitutional rights.”1 
 
Consider the following scenario in light of the ethical and the legal implications 
that would arise:  
A cystic fibrosis patient, nearly 18 years old and unmarried, is brought to 
the ER in respiratory distress.  She’s told the ER nurses and the attending 
doctor that she wants a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order, but her parents 
are refusing to sign it.  Meanwhile, the patient goes into respiratory arrest.  
What would you do?2    
This scenario was printed in a 1993 edition of the nursing magazine, RN, along with 
the responses provided from various nursing professionals.  In reply, the majority of 
nurses expressed that any solution would be problematic based on the ethical and 
legal issues involved.3  For instance, a Tennessee home health nurse wrote “I would 
have to assist in the code [to resuscitate], even though it would break my heart,”4 and 
a Pennsylvania rehab nurse commented “I would like to honor the patient’s wishes, 
but I have no legal basis for doing so.”5  The moderator, Amy Haddad, a physician 
and widely publicized ethicist, noted that although parents have the legal right to 
make medical decisions for their minor children, minors have rights as well.6  Even if 
there are ethical reasons for not issuing or implementing a DNR, we must remember 
that parents do not always do what is best for their children, and it is possible that 
there are other factors that must be taken into consideration.7 
As reflected by the scenario, as well as the nurses’ responses, matters involving a 
minor’s capacity to make health care decisions are highly debated.  Changes in both 
the common law and legislation over the years have resulted in minors gaining some 
degree of autonomy in making their own medical decisions.8  According to Professor 
Angela Holder, “[t]he court and legislatures of this country have not been unmindful 
of [these] societal changes, and there is a definite trend toward allowing adolescents 
more freedom to make decisions, and to exercise autonomy and self-determination in 
                                                                
1Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
2Amy Haddad, Ethics in Action; Ethics in Medical Emergencies; Acute Care Decisions, 




6Haddad, supra note 2. 
7Id. (specifically, other factors include abuse and/or neglect situations). 
8See generally Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: 
Physician Perceptions and Practice, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 87, 88 (2001) (specifically 
discussing the specific exceptions to the legal presumption of incapacity for adolescents to 
make medical treatment decisions).   
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their relationships with healthcare providers.”9  Even though these decisions 
typically involve low-risk medical procedures, as opposed to life-saving or life-
sustaining treatment, some states permit minors to make significant medical 
decisions, including whether to have an abortion without parental consent or notice.10  
Using reasoning similar to the abortion argument, this note will conclude that Ohio’s 
DNR Order law should be amended to include an exception for unemancipated 
mature minors who wish to initiate a DNR order when their parents refuse to consent 
on their behalf. 
Part one discusses Ohio's current DNR law, which does not include an exception 
for mature minors.11  It explains the medical difference between initiating a valid 
DNR order and refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.  However, the note solely 
focuses on DNR and how it relates to a minor’s right to initiate his or her own DNR 
order in light of parental disagreement.   
Part two explains the evolution of the minor and healthcare.  Specifically, the 
progression from the early common law assumption that minors lack the capacity to 
consent, to the present, in which minors are permitted to make some medical 
treatment decisions without parental consent or knowledge. 
Part three examines the development of the mature minor exception, and the 
effect it has had on minor’s healthcare rights.  This section will also discuss three 
cases that have applied a mature minor exception in determining whether a minor 
was capable of consenting to some form of medical treatment.12 
Part four compares West Virginia and New York’s DNR statutes to Ohio’s 
current law, and ultimately determines that Ohio’s law should be amended to permit 
mature minor's to initiate a DNR order with or without parental consent.  
Part five will focus specifically on Ohio’s abortion statute, which recognizes a 
mature minor’s right to have an abortion without parental consent or knowledge.13  It 
will include an overview of Ohio's abortion law, and an explanation of the judicial 
bypass proceeding for a mature minor who does not wish to notify her parents.  The 
section will also discuss the mature minor exception as it was applied in the abortion 
cases of Bellotti v. Baird,14 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,15 In re Jane 
                                                                
9Angela R. Holder, Minors’ Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400, 3402 
(1987), quoted in Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless 
Conundrum, 51 Hastings L.J. 1265, 1308 (2000) (discussing the conflict between legal and 
social concerns regarding minors and their healthcare rights). 
10See generally Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a 
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life Sustaining Treatment?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1996) 
(comparing the abortion decision to life-sustaining treatment decisions, which may not be the 
same argument, but carries similar weight and is based on the same premise). 
11See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.21-2133.26 (Anderson 2002). 
12Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987), In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 
1989), and Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151 (PA. 2000). 
13See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson 2002). 
14443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
15497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
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Doe 1,16 and In re Jane Doe.17  It will conclude that Ohio law should apply the 
mature minor exception to the area of DNR because it already applies in the 
significant medical situation of abortion.   
All of the above factors lead to the conclusion that Ohio should amend its current 
law to include an exception for unemancipated mature minors who wish to initiate 
their own DNR orders. Additionally, the exception should provide a method for 
resolving disputes when the minor’s wishes and the parent’s wishes are in conflict.  
This section will provide a draft for a proposed exception to Ohio's DNR law that 
will include a provision for mature minors. 
II.  DO NOT RESUSCITATE: AN OVERVIEW  
"[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law."18 
A.  A Do Not Resuscitate Order:  What is it and Why is it Issued? 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was initially developed to preserve life, 
restore health, relieve suffering and limit disability of persons who unexpectedly 
went into cardiac arrest.19  More specifically, it is an emergency lifesaving procedure 
that is performed when a person's own breathing or heartbeat have stopped.20 CPR is 
a combination of rescue breathing, which provides oxygen to the victim's lungs, and 
chest compressions, which keep oxygenated blood circulating until an effective 
heartbeat and breathing can be restored.21  CPR was not, however, intended to delay 
the approaching death of terminally ill patients.22  Despite its intended purpose, CPR 
continues to be classified as an “emergency” procedure for which patients’ consent is 
presumed unless an order is issued to the contrary.23  
Not long after the development of resuscitation techniques in the 1960's, it 
became clear that a minimal number of patients who were successfully resuscitated 
survived long enough to be discharged from the hospital.24 Because many 
resuscitated patients were elderly, terminally ill, or severely and irreversibly 
demented, resuscitation only prolonged their suffering or sustained patients in a 
                                                                
16566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1990). 
172002 Ohio 3926, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3994 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2002). 
18Union P.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
19George P. Smith, Euphemistic Codes and Tell-Tale Hearts: Humane Assistance in End-
of-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 178 (2000). 
20See TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
(2003), available at www.Tabers.com. 
21Id. 
22See Smith, supra note 19, at 178. 
23Id. 
24Id. at 176. 
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permanent vegetative state.25  Resuscitation was determined to not always be in the 
patient's best interests, and many physicians believed that resuscitating every patient 
was in violation of the "ethical principle of non-malfeasance (not doing harm).”26   
DNR orders direct hospital staff not to apply CPR if and when cardiac or 
respiratory arrest occurs.27  There are two basic responses to patients in 
cardiopulmonary arrest: code or no code.28  To “code” a patient means to administer 
CPR, while “no code” implies that aggressive treatment will not be given to the 
patient in cardiac arrest (typically DNR).29  DNR orders are issued so that the patient 
can avoid the negative effects of CPR.  Even after receiving CPR, only five to ten 
percent of patients survive and are able to function as they once did.30  Some patients 
survive but subsequently die before they are released from the hospital.31  If a patient 
survives, he or she may suffer from a collapsed lung or a broken rib.32  More serious 
side effects of CPR, such as brain damage, may also occur.33  Finally, even if a 
patient survives CPR and is not injured, the patient may be left weak and the CPR 
has prolonged an already uncomfortable dying process. 
Historically, hospitals favored administering CPR in an attempt to maintain life.34  
However, in the 1960’s, the doctrine of informed consent became more widely 
recognized as it allowed for increased patient autonomy and a decline in unilateral 
decision making by physicians.35  This increase in autonomy resulted in the 
appearance of DNR orders, as a vehicle for hospitals to address life saving treatment 
decisions.  These new procedures arose as a result of evolutions in technology and 
subsequently created a new wave of ethical dilemmas in healthcare.36  It also opened 
the door to a number of legal issues, including the right to die, which has led more 
patients to become involved in decisions regarding their medical treatment.37  In 
1973, The American Hospital Association adopted the Patients’ Bill of Rights, which 
                                                                
25Id. 
26Id., quoting Mark H. Ebell, Practical Guidelines for Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 50 Am. 
Fam. Physician 1293, 1293 (1994). 
27Smith, supra note 21, at 177. 
28Id. 
29Id. 






34AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE DNR POLICIES: DEVELOPMENT, REVISION, 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1990).  
35Id. at 2. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
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allowed patients to be apprised of their diagnosis and treatment options, and allowed 
patients to consent or refuse treatment, to the extent that the law would allow.38  By 
1986, most hospitals had implemented DNR orders, and in 1987 New York State 
became the first state to pass DNR legislation.39 
B.  Ohio’s Current Do Not Resuscitate Law 
Ohio's current DNR law does not allow for anyone under the age of eighteen to 
initiate a DNR order.  A DNR order is a “directive issued by a physician that 
identifies a person and specifies that CPR should not be administered to the person 
so identified.”40   CPR is further defined as “cardiopulmonary resuscitation or a 
component of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, but it does not include clearing a 
person’s airway for a purpose other than as a component of CPR.”41  Under Ohio’s 
DNR law, a declarant may issue a declaration ordering the withholding or 
withdrawal of CPR.42  A declarant is considered “any adult who has executed a 
declaration…”43  An adult is simply defined as “an individual who is eighteen years 
of age or older.”44 In order for a physician to withdraw or withhold CPR from a 
declarant, the declarant must execute a declaration and receive DNR identification.45 
Additionally, many states have added the right to refuse Life Sustaining Medical 
Treatment to their current statutes.  DNR orders differ from Life Sustaining Medical 
Treatment (“LSMT”) in a very specific, yet also very subtle, manner.  LSMT is 
defined as “any medical procedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that, 
when administered to a qualified patient or other patient, will serve principally to 
prolong the process of dying.”46  DNR is limited to situations in which CPR is 
withheld or withdrawn from a person, as opposed to LSMT, which can include a 
number of procedures used to sustain life functions, such as nutrition or hydration.47  
DNR policies are not designed to address issues relating to the withdrawal of 
treatment or withholding of any treatment other than CPR.  Furthermore, refusing 
LSMT may include a DNR order, based on the patient's wishes, but such an 
                                                                
38Id. 
39ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE 161 (1992). 
40OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.21(D) (Anderson 2002). 
41Id. at 2133.21(G). 
42Id. at 2133.21. 
43Id. at 2133.01(E). 
44Id. at 2133.01(A) (currently there is not a provision in Ohio’s law for anyone under the 
age of eighteen who wishes to consent to a DNR order). 
45OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.23 (Anderson 2002). 
46OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01(Q) (Anderson 2002) (Under Ohio law, in order to 
issue a declaration regarding the withdrawal or continuation of LSMT, the declarant must be 
an adult of at least eighteen years of age or older.  This definition applies to both LSMT, as 
well as DNR). 
47See id. 
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inclusion is not necessary.48  In analyzing the right of a minor to refuse life-saving 
medical treatment, one must look specifically at a DNR order, which does not 
interfere with the patient’s medical care in any way other than if the patient goes into 
cardiac arrest and requires resuscitation. 
III.  A LOOK AT THE MINOR AND HEALTHCARE:  PAST AND PRESENT 
“Remarkably, the legal presumption of decisional incapacity for adolescent 
patients rests on scant scientific and social evidence.  Developmental research 
suggests that adolescents are decisionally capable, at least beyond the level 
presently presumed by law.”49 
 
Should parents have the right to insist on life-saving treatment against the wishes 
of their child?50  This situation undeniably occurs, however the circumstances are yet 
to be tested in court.  Currently, Ohio law does not allow a minor to make decisions 
regarding most of his or her own medical treatment, let alone refuse treatment.  A 
minor is defined as “an infant or person who is under the age of legal 
competence…[i]n most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 
18.”51  Traditionally, common law has presumed that minors are incompetent and 
therefore not permitted to initiate or consent to any form of medical treatment on 
their own.52  The issue that arises from this presumption is whether a minor should 
have some degree of autonomy when it comes to making healthcare decisions.   
A.  A Historical Glance at the Minor’s Healthcare Rights 
Autonomy is defined as “the expression of informed preferences or consent to 
whatever we do, or is done to us by others.”53  In medical treatment decisions, 
autonomy applies to the right of a patient to give or withhold informed consent; 
specifically, the right of a patient to either consent to treatment or turn down 
unwanted treatment.54  Adults are presumed to be capable of making their own 
healthcare choices, as self-determining or self-governing beings.55  Alternatively, 
minors are presumed legally incapable, therefore requiring parents to make 
healthcare decisions for their children.56 
                                                                
48See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.03 (Anderson 2002). 
49Hartman, supra note 8, at 89. 
50See N.S. Morton, Pediatric Issues, in ETHICS AND THE LAW IN INTENSIVE CARE 125, 129 
(1996). 
51BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed. 1990). 
52See Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should have the 
Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 112 (2000). 
53R.S. Downie, Introduction to Medical Ethics, in ETHICS AND THE LAW IN INTENSIVE 
CARE 1, 6 (1996). 
54Id. 
55See Hartman, supra note 9, at 1266. 
56Id. 
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Based on the historical presumption that minors are legally incapable, a physician 
is required to obtain consent from the patient’s parents or guardians before 
administering treatment.57  By requiring parental consent, the law presumes that 
parents are acting in the best interests of their children.  While this may be the typical 
case, in some instances, parents may not be acting in their child’s best interests.58  In 
a speech given to the Illinois College of Law, Professor Walter Wadlington inquires 
as to whether it is appropriate to presume that parents are acting in the best interests 
of their children at a time when the creation of child abuse reporting statutes and 
minor consent laws are becoming more widespread.59   
In most cases, parents are not acting maliciously, but are unwilling to let go of 
their child, even if it would allow the child to end an extremely painful existence.  
For instance, a child who has lived with AIDS or cancer may be ready and willing to 
accept death, rather than live life in pain.  Because some diseases are diagnosed at an 
early age, a minor may have the disease long enough to have a heightened awareness 
of what it means to live with it.60  The child can be more prepared to face his or her 
own death and forego a painful resuscitation, while the parents are unwilling to lose 
their child.  In these instances, a minor may wish to initiate a DNR order if they are 
ever to go into cardiac arrest, directing attending physicians not to resuscitate. 
Also, in issues of neglect or abuse, parents who have not been looking out for 
their child’s best interests while they are alive cannot be trusted to make the right 
choices when their child wants to die.  In the case of neglect or abuse, the state has 
the right to step in and take custody of the child away from the parents when they are 
not acting in the best interests of their children.61  This rationale is known as the 
doctrine of parens patriae, allowing the state to assume the role of “ultimate 
protector” for all children.  Given the state’s interest in preserving the best interests 
of the minor, when making the decision whether to allow a child to die, the state’s 
interests must be considered in the balance.62  A minor’s interest in autonomy should 
be weighed by taking into consideration the risk of harm from the minor’s own poor 
                                                                
57See generally Ann Eileen Driggs, R.N., The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents 
Have the Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 689-690 (2001).  See also Jessica A. 
Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical 
Treatment - Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1174 
(1996). 
58Driggs, supra note 57, at 689-690.  See also Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 54, at 
117.  (parents may be neglectful, abusive, selfish, uncaring, or similarly detrimental to their 
child’s best interests) 
59Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between 
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 332 (1994). 
60See Haddad, supra note 2, at 23. 
61See Driggs, supra note 57, at 689-690.  See also Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 
52, at 117. 
62See Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 112-113. 
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decisions, the interests of the minor’s parents, and society’s interest in promoting the 
well-being of all minors.63 
The interest of a child’s life lies in many hands.  In one hand is the minor’s 
interests in ending the painful treatments he or she has been enduring and refusing to 
endure the suffering caused by the administration of CPR.64  On the other hand, is the 
interests of the minor’s parents to preserve the life of their child and the interests of 
the state to preserve the best interests of every minor.65  For this reason, most states 
do not permit minors to make medical decisions without parental consent 
notwithstanding a few common law exceptions and recent statutory exemptions.66  
Common law exceptions have emerged for emergency situations and emancipated 
minors.67  Additionally, some states have enacted statutory exemptions for married 
minors, mature minors, venereal disease treatment, alcohol abuse treatment and 
abortion.68   
B.  Exceptions to the Common Law Rule 
In the case of an emergency situation, if a minor’s condition requires immediate 
attention because it poses imminent danger to the minor’s health, and parental 
consent is not available, courts typically hold that parental consent is implied by law.  
Anything requiring immediate attention, or that is causing a child to be in pain or to 
be fearful, constitutes an emergency.69  The emergency exception arose out of the 
notion that the state’s interest in protecting children is diminished when a physician 
refuses to render care to a minor for fear of being sued by the minor’s parents.70 
The emancipated minor assumes all legal responsibility for himself or herself, 
and when making healthcare decisions there is no legal duty for a parent to consent.  
A minor may be emancipated from parental care and control because of status, such 
as marriage or military service, or a state may provide a statutory procedure for a 
                                                                
63LEGISLATING MEDICAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK STATE DO-NOT-
RESUSCITATE LAW 129 (Robert Baker et al. eds., 1994). 
64See generally Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 117 (responding to arguments 
against a mature minor’s right to refuse LSMT, including the state’s parens patriae duty).  See 
also Penkower, supra note 57, at 1165 (balancing of ethical interests involves adolescent’s 
interest in ending treatment and society’s interest in preserving life). 
65Id. 
66See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1176-1177 (discussing the “Early Exceptions to the 
Common Law Rule” of a minor’s capacity to consent to medical treatment).  See also Driggs, 
supra note 57, at 690-691 (discussing three general exceptions to the parental consent 
requirement, including: emancipation, emergency, and mature minor.  Furthermore, none of 
the exceptions are recognized in the refusal of treatment).  See also Hartman, supra note 9, at 
1309-1310. 
67See generally id. 
68Id. 
69See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1176-1177. 
70Id. at 1177. 
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self-supporting minor who wishes to be emancipated.71  Generally, an emancipated 
minor’s parents have no legal involvement in the child’s life, including care, custody 
and control of their child and the child’s earnings.72  Emancipation may be expressed 
or implied.73  If the emancipation is expressed, the parents and minor have 
voluntarily agreed to the entire surrender of the minor.74  If the emancipation is 
implied, the parents and the minor conduct themselves as if the minor is 
emancipated.75  Implied emancipation may be complete, which involves the complete 
surrender of care, or it may be partial, which only frees the minor from a part of the 
period of minority or a part of the parents’ rights.76  Additionally, if a minor is not 
formally emancipated, but is married or, in some instances, has a child, the minor 
may be deemed emancipated and therefore permitted to make his or her own medical 
decisions.77   
Married minors may make decisions regarding their own health care, as well as 
the health care of their minor children.  In Ohio, minors may marry at sixteen if 
female and eighteen if male.78  If a minor is married, emancipated, or in an 
emergency situation, consent will not be needed from a parent or guardian for a 
physician to perform a medical procedure.  However, in the case of an emergency 
situation in which a minor requires CPR, a physician is required to resuscitate, even 
if it is against the patient’s wishes.   
If a minor does not fall within one of the above exceptions, but is deemed 
sufficiently mature, the mature minor exception will allow a minor to receive some 
medical treatment without parental consent.79  Minors have also been given 
additional statutory rights to refuse or receive some medical treatment.80  These 
statutory exemptions may or may not require a finding of maturity for the physician 
to treat the patient. 
Most states currently allow minors to make some medical treatment decisions.  
Such treatment decisions include care for venereal diseases, contraception, blood 
donation, drug and alcohol abuse treatment, and abortion.81  Generally, the medical 
procedures listed, except for abortion, do not require a physician to find that the 
minor is mature in order to treat him or her without receiving parental consent.  
                                                                
71Robert L. Stenger, Exclusive or Concurrent Competence to Make Medical Decisions for 
Adolescents in the United States and United Kingdom, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 209, 211 (2000).  
72See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1177. 




77See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1177. 
78OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson 2002). 
79See generally Hartman, supra note 9, at 1309-1310. 
80See id. 
81Id. 
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These exemptions were created based on the need for minors to be permitted to 
confidentially seek some of their own medical treatments; and the determination that 
the minor’s interests in having confidential medical treatment outweigh the parent’s 
interest in their child’s healthcare.82 
C.  Ohio’s Statutory Exceptions 
Ohio currently has laws that allow minors, without a finding of maturity, to make 
their own medical treatment decisions without parental consent.  Ohio minors may 
receive venereal disease treatment and drug and alcohol abuse treatment, without 
parental consent and without the requirement that the physician make a finding of 
maturity.83  These exemptions arose from the need to allow minors to seek treatment 
without fear of their parent’s disapproval and to protect abuse victims.84   
An Ohio minor may give consent for the diagnosis or treatment of any venereal 
disease by a licensed physician without additional consent by a parent or guardian.85  
These laws arose from the increase in sexually transmitted diseases among minors 
and the fear that minors would not seek treatment if they were required to obtain 
consent from their parents.86  In this instance, Ohio recognized the need for minors to 
be permitted to receive treatment without the knowledge or consent of their parents 
or guardians.  Furthermore, the attending physician may treat minors without 
determining if they are mature enough to consent to the treatment.    
Similarly, in Ohio, a minor may give consent to a physician for the diagnosis or 
treatment of any condition that is reasonably believable to be caused by the abuse of 
drugs, beer, or intoxicating liquor.87  A physician may render medical or surgical 
services to a minor giving consent for an alcohol or drug-related condition and will 
not be subject to criminal or civil liability.88  In drug and alcohol abuse treatment, 
Ohio again recognizes the need for a minor to be permitted to confidentially seek 
treatment, without obtaining consent from a parent or guardian.  Under these 
circumstances the physician may perform surgical services without seeking consent 
by the minor’s parents. 
                                                                
82Alan R. Fleischman, Caring for Gravely Ill Children, PEDIATRICS, October 1994, at 433-
439 (discussing the “special considerations” that should be given to adolescent patients, 
including the request for confidentiality during treatment). 
83See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 2002).  See also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3719.012 (Anderson 2002). 
84See Hartman, supra note 9, at 1309-1310. 
85See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 2002). 
86See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1178. 
87See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012 (Anderson 2002). 
88Id. 
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IV.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE MATURE MINOR EXCEPTION 
“For the protection of the individual and the protection of society, the mature 
minor doctrine is set into practice.”89 
A.  The Mature Minor Exception Defined 
In response to the obvious necessity for exceptions to the common law parental 
consent rule, courts began allowing exceptions permitting minors to make some of 
their own medical treatment decisions.90  The mature minor doctrine is an exception 
to the premise that minors are generally incompetent.91  It allows a minor who 
“exhibits the maturity of an adult to make decisions traditionally reserved for those 
who have attained the age of majority.”92  In cases involving a terminally ill minor, 
the minor typically exhibits a much higher degree of competence and an increased 
ability to make informed medical decisions regarding his or her own treatment.93  
This increased decision making ability is a result of the minor experiencing the 
illness for some time, understanding the illness and the prognosis, and being 
involved in the decision making process.94   
The mature minor exception provides that a physician will not be held liable for 
battery or malpractice, if the physician treats a consenting minor of sufficient 
maturity without the parent's consent.95  Under this doctrine, physicians are not liable 
for unconsented touching when the minor has given permission for treatment under 
these limited circumstances.  They are liable only if they exceed the boundaries.96  
Without the mature minor exception, physicians must obtain parental consent prior 
to treating a minor, or be subject to an assault and battery or malpractice action.97  In 
order for the exception to apply, the physician must first make a determination 
regarding the minor's capacity and maturity to make such decisions.98  The physician 
is the most capable to determine the minor patient’s maturity, including the patient’s 
understanding of the disease, the treatment options, and the suffering that would be 
endured.99  Some of the factors to be weighed in determining the maturity of a minor 
                                                                
89RICHARD HEDGES, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES, BIOETHICS, HEALTHCARE, AND THE 
LAW: A DICTIONARY 144 (1999) (defining mature minor in both the medical and legal 
contexts). 
90H. NEIL WIGDER, Minor Refusing Treatment, in STANDARDS OF CARE IN EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND LEGAL LIABILITY 24 (1994). 
91Id. 
92Penkower, supra note 57, at 1166. 
93Fleischman, supra note 82. 
94See Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 113. 
95Hedges, supra note 89. 
96Id. 
97Id. 
98Fleischman, supra note 82. 
99See generally Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 118-119. 
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include: the minor’s age; ability; experience; education; training; degree of maturity 
or judgment obtained by the minor; conduct and demeanor of the minor; the nature 
of the treatment and its risks or probable consequences; and the minor's ability to 
appreciate the risks and consequences.100  
Based on the special physician-patient relationship, the opinion of the attending 
physician as to his patient's competence should be considered in the highest 
regard.101  If the physician feels as if his patient is competent and “mature” enough to 
consent to the treatment, and the patient does in fact consent, the physician should be 
permitted to treat his or her patient as the patient wishes.102  To date, the Supreme 
Court has not made a determination as to whether there is a constitutionally based 
right for minors to refuse medical treatment.  Even though the Supreme Court has 
not made a ruling, many states have recognized that minors are competent enough to 
make decisions regarding medical treatment.103  
B.  Cases Involving a Mature Minor’s Right to Initiate or Refuse Medical Treatment 
One of the earliest cases to consider this issue is Cardwell v. Bechtol,104 in which 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held a defendant physician not liable for providing 
medical care to a seventeen-year-old without parental consent.105  The Court based its 
holding on the fact that the patient was sufficiently mature to make a decision 
regarding her medical treatment.  The defendant physician testified that the patient 
appeared to be a mature young woman, and that her demeanor led him to think that 
she was of age, therefore no parental consent was sought.106  The Court found that the 
plaintiff “had the ability, maturity, experience, education and judgment at her 17 
years, 7 months of age to consent knowingly to medical treatment.”107 
Another case which addresses a patient's maturity level in connection with her 
right to refuse medical treatment is In re E.G.108  In this case, a seventeen-year-old 
refused a blood transfusion based on her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.109  The 
Illinois Supreme Court held that courts must balance the state’s interest in the 
sanctity of life and the state’s parens patriae power to protect those incompetent to 
protect themselves, with the minor’s maturity.110  The Court found that if the 
                                                                
100Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748. 
101Fleischman, supra note 82. 
102Id. 
103See Rosato, supra note 10, 10-16. 
104724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987). 
105Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748. 
106Id. at 743. 
107Id. at 749. 
108549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
109Id. at 323. 
110Id. at 327-328.  (parens patriae allows the state to assume the role of “ultimate 
protector” to all children) 
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evidence is clear and convincing that the minor patient is sufficiently mature to 
appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that she is mature enough to exercise 
the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine allows her the common law 
right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.111  However, in its opinion, the Court 
stated that the parent’s consent was a significant factor in its decision: 
If a parent or guardian opposes an unemancipated mature minor’s refusal 
to consent to treatment for a life-threatening health problem, this 
opposition would weigh heavily against the minor's right to refuse. In this 
case, for example, had E.G. refused the transfusions against the wishes of 
her mother, then the court would have given serious consideration to her 
mother's desires.112 
The last case to be discussed regarding the application of the mature minor 
exception is Commonwealth v. Nixon.113  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held 
that the maturity of an unemancipated minor is not a sufficient affirmative defense.114  
As such, the minor patient’s parents were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and 
child endangerment, after they refused to seek medical treatment for their 
daughter.115  The Court ruled against the mature minor exception defense in this case, 
but Justice Cappy, in his concurrence, recognized the need to allow some minors to 
consent or refuse medical treatment:116 
[i]n the same way, I believe that when it is demonstrated that a minor has 
the capacity to understand the nature of his or her condition, appreciate 
the consequences of the choices he or she makes, and reach a decision 
regarding medical intervention in a responsible fashion, he or she should 
have the right to consent to or refuse treatment. I would, therefore, adopt 
the mature minor doctrine.117 
C.  The Medical Perspective 
Even though legal opinions seem varied, medical professionals tend to agree that 
minor patients, specifically those who have dealt with terminal illnesses, may have 
the competence and maturity to make their own decisions.  For example, the 
American Nurses’ Association’s Code of Ethics states that minors have rights to 
“determine what will be done with his or her person…and to accept, refuse, or 
                                                                
111Id.  
112Id. at 328. 
113761 A.2d at 1151 (Pa. 2000). 
114761 A.2d at 1152. 
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116Id. at 1157. 
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terminate treatment.”118  Further, the Code states that nurses must respect these rights 
to “the fullest degree permissible under the law.”119  
Additionally, the American Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee on Bioethics’ 
guidelines state that minors possessing “decision-making” capacity should be 
informed and permitted to make health care decisions.120  Decision-making capacity 
is further defined as the ability to understand and communicate information relevant 
to a decision, the ability to reason and deliberate concerning the decision, and the 
ability to apply a set of values to a decision that may involve conflicting elements.121  
These medical opinions seem to be based primarily on the premise that minors who 
have dealt with terminal illness are sufficiently capable to make their own medical 
treatment decisions.  As stated by the American Academy of Pediatrics, in an article 
in Pediatrics,122 adolescents, specifically those with a terminal illness, may have an 
increased decision-making capacity.123  If there is a disagreement in the course of 
treatment between the patient and parent, the physician, after a careful review of the 
patient's mental abilities, should ideally respect the patient's decision.124  
The concept of the ‘mature minor,’ which recognizes that some 
adolescents possess sufficient autonomy to be allowed to consent to or 
refuse care without parental involvement and regardless of parental 
objection, is receiving increasing recognition.  We believe that this trend, 
which supports the involvement and autonomy of the adolescent patient, 
is important, and should be expanded to include all capable adolescents.125   
V.  NEW YORK AND WEST VIRGINIA:  RECOGNITION OF A MATURE MINOR’S RIGHTS 
IN DO NOT RESUSCITATE LAW 
“[I]n some cases, it will be ethically acceptable and appropriate to respect the 
choice of a capable, unemancipated minor to withhold or to stop life-saving or life-
sustaining treatment, even in the face of parental objections.”126 
 
The idea of a mature minor's capability to consent to his or her own DNR order is 
statutorily recognized in both New York and West Virginia.127  Both states extended 
                                                                
118Haddad, supra note 2 (quoting American Nurses’ Association ).  CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
NURSES WITH INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS (1985). 
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their DNR laws to include the rights of the mature minor.128  Ideally, more states may 
begin to follow the lead of New York and West Virginia and recognize the 
importance of the mature minor exception and the autonomy of the capable minor 
patient. 
A.  West Virginia’s DNR Law 
West Virginia currently recognizes that some minors possess the capacity and 
maturity to consent to end-of-life treatment decisions.  In the issuance of a DNR 
order, West Virginia's law provides that a parent may refuse CPR on behalf of his or 
her minor child, provided that a second physician who has examined the child 
concurs with the opinion of the attending physician.129  Furthermore, a minor, 
between the ages of 16 and 18, who is, in the opinion of the attending physician, 
sufficiently mature enough to understand the nature and effect of a DNR order, must 
be included in the decision to refuse CPR in order for the DNR order to be valid.130  
In the event of a conflict between the wishes of the parents or guardians and the 
wishes of the mature minor, the wishes of the mature minor shall prevail.131  The law 
does not specify that a minor patient’s decision will not prevail if the minor is 
seeking the initiation of a DNR order and his or her parents are refusing to consent, 
resulting in the assumption that it may be left to judicial interpretation if the situation 
arises.  
This statutory exception was applied in the West Virginia Supreme Court's 
decision in Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center.132  In this case, the defendant 
physician did not obtain consent from decedent, a seventeen-year-old, before issuing 
a DNR order.133  The Court held that there is no “hard and fast” rule providing a 
particular age to deem a “mature minor.”134  The Court applied the rule in Cardwell 
and held that:135  
Whether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment depends 
upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of 
maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, as well as upon the conduct 
and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved. Moreover, 
the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the treatment and its risks 
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or probable consequences, and the minor's ability to appreciate the risks 
and consequences are to be considered.136  
In making its decision, the Court found that it was likely that a minor, who has dealt 
with a serious illness, was capable of making his or her own medical treatment 
decisions.137  “It is difficult to imagine that a young person who is under the age of 
majority, yet, who has undergone medical treatment for a permanent or recurring 
illness over the course of a long period of time, may not be capable of taking part in 
decisions concerning that treatment”138 
However, the Court was cautious not to set a definite rule in the application of 
the mature minor doctrine.  It stated that application of the mature minor rule would 
vary from case to case, with the focus being on the maturity level of the minor at 
issue, and whether that minor has the capacity to appreciate the nature and risks 
involved in the procedure to be performed or the treatment to be withheld.139  
Furthermore, the Court noted that where there is a conflict between the patient and 
the parents, the physician must make a good faith assessment of the minor's maturity 
level.140  After making this assessment, if the physician deems the minor to be 
sufficiently mature, the physician is protected from liability for failure to obtain 
parental consent.141  In the most difficult of cases where the patient and the parents 
do not agree, if the minor is deemed mature, the physician may resolve the conflict 
on his or her own.142   
B.  New York’s DNR Law 
While it has not been tested in court as to whether a minor may initiate a DNR 
order when the parents refuse to consent, New York State has also implemented a 
DNR law that requires the mature minor to refuse CPR before the order can be 
validated.143  In the case of conflict between the parents and patient's wishes, there is 
a mediation program in place to resolve disputes.144 
In New York State, if a DNR order is requested and the minor patient has the 
capacity to consent, the physician must obtain the consent of the patient before 
issuing the order.145  The attending physician must first determine whether the patient 
is capable of making life-ending treatment decisions.  In the case of a conflict 
between the parent(s) and the patient, the physician may refer the matter to the 
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143See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2967 (Consol. 2002). 
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dispute mediation system.146  Each hospital is statutorily required to implement a 
dispute mediation program for the purposes of remedying disputes involving DNR 
orders.  Once a dispute is submitted to the dispute mediation board, a DNR order 
cannot be issued until the mediation is settled, or if an order has already been issued, 
it shall be revoked.147  Parties interested in participating in mediation are also entitled 
to judicial review, if they are unhappy with the outcome of the mediation.148   
If either party is unhappy with the decision of the mediation board, the patient or 
parent may seek a judicial review of the determination.149  Further, a parent may 
bypass mediation and seek judicial review if he or she can show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the DNR order is not in the minor patient’s best interests.150  
If the parent seeks judicial review through these means, the court may issue a 
temporary restraining order, enjoining the order not to resuscitate until the 
completion of the proceedings.151  Each decision would be made on a case-by-case 
basis, with an analysis of the maturity, conceptual ability, and experience in making 
important life decisions.152   
West Virginia and New York have implemented statutes that recognize the 
mature minor DNR decision-making.  As time goes on, more states may begin to 
follow in their footsteps and implement their own statutory exceptions to DNR law.  
However, many states, including Ohio, have already implemented laws permitting 
mature minors to make abortion decisions without parental notification or consent.  
In doing so, these states are acknowledging the need for minors to be permitted to 
make their own decisions regarding medical treatment.  
VI.  THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE ABORTION DECISION 
“The United States Supreme Court has developed a mature minor doctrine for 
abortion decisions that is significantly more deferential to minors than the general 
rule governing the medical treatment decisions of minors.”153 
 
Most states require parental consent for a minor who wishes to have an abortion.  
However, states that have a parental consent requirement for abortion are required by 
the United States Supreme Court to include a judicial bypass clause for the law to be 
held constitutional.154  The bypass clause give directives for an unemancipated 
minor, after a finding of sufficient maturity, to seek an abortion without parental 
consent or notice.155  Judicial bypass clauses recognize that many minors are 
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competent enough to make decisions regarding invasive procedures such as 
abortions.156  They also allow for situations in which a parent or guardian may not be 
acting in a minor's best interest.157   
A.  Ohio’s Abortion Law 
Ohio law permits an unmarried minor to seek an abortion without notice to 
parent, guardian or custodian.158  The statute specifically allows a pregnant, 
unmarried and unemancipated woman, under the age of eighteen, to seek an abortion 
without the notification of her parents, if she can prove that she is either sufficiently 
mature, or that she is the victim of abuse.159 
In order to seek an abortion without parental notification, the complainant must 
file a complaint in the juvenile court of her county, bordering counties or counties 
where an abortion clinic is located.160  The complaint must allege that the 
complainant is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to intelligently decide 
whether to have an abortion without the notification of her parents, guardian, or 
custodian.161  Alternatively, if she is not sufficiently mature, the complainant must 
show that one or both of her parents, her guardian, or her custodian was engaged in a 
pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that the notification of 
her parents, guardian, or custodian otherwise is not in her best interest.162  Once the 
petition is brought before the court, the court must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that the complainant is sufficiently mature and well informed to decide 
intelligently whether to have an abortion.163  Recognizing the minor’s right to bodily 
integrity, the judicial bypass procedure was a result of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bellotti v. Baird. 
B.  Court Decisions on the Mature Minor's Right to Consent to an Abortion 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court weighed a woman’s right to choose to 
seek an abortion against the state’s right to encourage an unmarried pregnant minor 
to seek consent and advice from her parents.164  A Massachusetts statute required 
parental consent for an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion except in an 
emergency situation.  This statute was declared unconstitutional by the District 
Court, and the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed.  The Supreme Court held that 
in the abortion context it is unconstitutional to require a minor to seek permission of 
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her parents or guardians, or to be required to notify her parents or guardians.165  
Furthermore, a state’s abortion statute must have a judicial bypass clause to allow a 
minor to seek an abortion without notification of her parents.166  In seeking the 
abortion, the minor must show the court that she is sufficiently mature and well 
enough informed to make the decision on her own.167  If the court does not deem her 
sufficiently competent to make the decision independently, she must show that an 
abortion would be in her best interests.168 Following the decision in Bellotti, the Ohio 
Supreme Court reviewed Ohio's abortion statute, in order to determine whether it 
survived constitutional scrutiny. 
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health examined House Bill 319, and 
determined that it was constitutional.169  The Supreme Court held Ohio's statute to be 
constitutional because it provides a method for an unmarried, unemancipated 
pregnant minor to have an abortion without parental notice, if she follows the 
judicial bypass procedure.170  Additionally, the Court found that H.B. 319 met the 
following four criteria, as established in Bellotti.171  First, the minor must be 
permitted to show that she is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to make 
the abortion decision regardless of her parent’s wishes.172  Second, if the minor is not 
able to show sufficient maturity, she must be permitted to show that the abortion is in 
her best interests.173  Third, there must be anonymity; and four, there must be a 
judicial bypass procedure that will ensure the minor an expedited opportunity to 
obtain the abortion.174  “We have, however, squarely held that a requirement of pre-
abortion parental notice in all cases involving pregnant minors is unconstitutional. 
Although it need not take the form of a judicial bypass, the State must provide an 
adequate mechanism for cases in which the minor is mature or notice would not be in 
her best interests.”175  Expanding on the judicial bypass requirement, Moyer’s 
dissenting opinion in In re Jane Doe 1 urged the adoption of a maturity test 
mirroring that in Cardwell, in order to ensure that the minor is sufficiently mature 
enough to make the decision regarding an abortion.176 
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in In re Jane Doe 1, held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the appellant was not sufficiently mature to make 
                                                                
165Id. at 653. 
166Id. at 647. 
167Id. 
168Id. at 647-648. 
169Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. at 506-07. 
170Id. at 507-508. 
171Id. at 511. 
172Id. 
173Id. 
174Id. at 512-13. 
175Id. at 522 (J. Stevens, concurring in judgment). 
176See In Re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d at 1185 (J. Moyer, dissenting in judgement). 
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a judgment regarding an abortion.177  Further, the Court held that she was unable to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that her father was engaged in a pattern of 
abuse.178  The appellant provided evidence that she was a senior in school, 
maintained a 3.0 grade point average, had plans to attend college, was employed, and 
was responsible for obtaining her own medical care.179  However, based on the 
testimony, the Court did not find sufficient maturity.  The Court also refused to adopt 
guidelines to assist trial courts in defining “sufficiently mature.”  However, Chief 
Justice Moyer, in dissent, urged that the court adopt the following factors to guide 
trial court’s in finding whether or not a minor is sufficiently mature: age, overall 
intelligence, emotional stability, credibility and demeanor as a witness, ability to 
accept responsibility, ability to assess the future impact of her present choices, ability 
to understand the medical consequences of abortion and apply that understanding to 
her decision, and any undue influence by another on the minor's decision. 180 
Finally, the Plaintiff in In re Jane Doe, appealed the Hamilton County Juvenile 
Court’s denial of her application to have an abortion without parental notification.181  
The Court of Appeals found that Jane Doe clearly and convincingly presented 
evidence that she was sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide 
intelligently whether to have an abortion without notification of her parents.182  In 
making this determination, the Court looked at Jane Doe’s relationship with her 
family and her desire to protect it from potential conflict; her academic standing in 
her high-school class; her active participation and leadership role in school 
extracurricular activities; her acceptance to college as a scholarship student; her 
consideration of adoption or foster care as alternatives; and, her introspection related 
to the consequences of her decision.183   The court stated that it could not “conceive 
of a case stronger than the present one.  If permission is not granted in this case, it 
will never be.  The law must be followed whether or not it fits our personal 
preferences.  To refuse to grant permission in this case would be to render R.C. 
2151.85 meaningless.”184 
From the decisions in the above cases, Ohio courts recognize the need for mature 
minors to make their own decisions regarding high-risk procedures, such as abortion, 
                                                                
177Id. at 1182. 
178Id. at 1184. 
179Id. at 1181. 
180Id. at 1185-86.  (J. Moyer, dissenting in judgment.  Justice Brown, in his dissent, also 
identifies factors relative to determining a minors maturity.  He states the determination of 
whether a minor is “mature should be made based on how she has conducted her entire life, 
and not just on the events which have brought her into court.  While maturity cannot be 
determined by resort to a simple, bright line test, it is possible to identify certain factors which 
are indicta of maturity and which may be used to focus the inquiry.”). 
181See In re Jane Doe, No. C-020443, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3994 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. 
App. July 10, 2002). 
182Id. at *5. 
183Id.  
184Id. at *4-5. 
380 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:359 
and therefore should permit mature minors to determine whether or not to initiate a 
DNR order if they so choose.   
VII.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OHIO’S DO NOT RESUSCITATE LAW 
“The best statutory protection for the minor’s right to self-determination would 
be to permit certain minors to execute legally enforceable advance health care 
directives.”185 
 
“Whether an adolescent should be able to direct that a DNR order be placed in 
his medical chart and honored presents a legal dilemma…Not surprisingly, allowing 
an adolescent patient to initiate a DNR order merits special consideration.”186  An 
analysis of the legal and ethical implications that arise results in the conclusion that 
Ohio should amend its DNR statute to include a mature minor exception.  This 
exception would allow unemancipated minors the right to initiate a DNR order 
without parental consent.  In doing so, Ohio would recognize the need for minors to 
be permitted to exercise some degree of autonomy in making their own medical 
decisions.  Cases must be taken on an individual basis, and each minor’s decision-
making capacity and maturity should be assessed before a physician issues a DNR 
order.  In the worst-case scenario, if one or both parents do not agree with the 
minor’s decision, the minor patient’s wishes must be taken into consideration, and 
weighed against the parent’s interests in keeping their child alive.187 
Ohio currently permits minors, regardless of a finding of maturity, to lawfully 
consent to and receive some medical treatments.  These decisions typically involve 
low to moderately invasive, but highly important, medical procedures, including 
treatment for venereal diseases, drug and alcohol abuse treatment, and contraception 
decisions.188  More importantly, Ohio currently recognizes a mature minor exception 
to the parental consent requirement in abortion cases.189  This exception recognizes 
that many minors are competent enough to make important and invasive medical 
decisions.  Furthermore, other jurisdictions have recognized the mature minor 
exception specifically for DNR order decisions.190 
The West Virginia Statute requires an unemancipated mature minor be involved 
in the decision whether to initiate a DNR order on his or her behalf.191  In the case of 
a conflict between a minor patient and the parent(s), the physician may make an 
independent determination as to the maturity of the minor.192  New York has also 
adopted a statutory exception to its DNR law, which requires a mature minor to 
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consent to the DNR order before a physician can issue it.193  However, New York has 
also created a mediation dispute provision, requiring hospitals to provide dispute 
resolution if there is a conflict between the minor patient’s wishes and the parent(s) 
wishes.194  If the mediation is not successful, the parties may then seek judicial 
review.195   
Obviously, courts and legislatures are accepting the responsibility of determining 
whether a minor is sufficiently mature to make some of their own medical treatment 
decisions.  Other jurisdictions recognize the need for mature minors to be involved in 
the decision regarding a DNR order, and Ohio currently recognizes the need in 
abortion decisions.  The question then arises as to why Ohio has not yet recognized 
that a necessity exists for permitting a mature minor the right to initiate a DNR order. 
An amendment to Ohio’s DNR law will include unmarried, unemancipated 
minors, without an age restriction.  Prior to the age of legal majority, no precise age 
or maturity level can be designated at which all minors should be permitted to make 
their own health care decisions.  Restricting a minor’s ability to initiate a DNR order 
based on age could possibly permit minors who are of age, but not yet sufficiently 
mature, to initiate a DNR order, while prohibiting minors who are not yet of age, but 
sufficiently mature, from initiating a DNR order. 
A determination of maturity would be made by the attending physician’s 
independent review.196  In order to make this determination, the physician must first 
discuss with the patient the meaning of issuing a DNR order and in what situations it 
would be applied.197  The physician must also discuss the patient’s illness in great 
detail, and the treatment options that would be available.198  Further, the physician 
would need to explain to the patient what his or her chances of surviving cardiac 
arrest, should it occur, and the quality of life the patient could expect following 
cardiac arrest and successful resuscitation.199  Finally, the physician must discuss the 
patient’s possibilities for a cure, even if they are minimal.200  Once the physician and 
patient have discussed all alternatives and treatment options, if the physician deems 
the minor to be mature, the physician should be permitted to initiate a DNR order for 
the minor patient.  If the parent and the patient are in agreement, a valid DNR order 
will be added to the patient’s file for reference if the patient is ever in cardiac arrest.  
If a situation arises in which the parent and patient do not concur, the physician 
will be responsible for referring the dispute to an approved mediation program in a 
                                                                
193See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2967. 
194Id. at § 2972. 
195Id. at § 2973. 
196See generally Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 118. (authors discuss a 
proposed solution which would allow a minor to make decisions regarding his or her own 
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timely manner, in which a determination will be made as to the minor's maturity.201  
The form and guidelines of the mediation program will also be statutorily set, but 
will be left to each hospital to implement.202  The mediation program will be 
available in order to lessen the burden on the court systems, and to avoid lawsuits 
against the hospital, should disputes arise.   
In order for the patient or parent to petition the court, the parties must first 
attempt to mediate the dispute using the hospital’s mediation procedure.203  If 
mediation is not effective, either party may seek a judicial bypass through the court 
system, allowing a judge to determine whether the DNR order should be validated.204  
In making a decision, the Court will look at the totality of the circumstances, and 
make a determination based on the minor's age, ability, experience, education, 
training, degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, conduct and 
demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved, the nature of the 
treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor’s ability to 
appreciate the risks and consequences.205  Once the court determines whether the 
minor is sufficiently mature, the court will issue an order directing the hospital to 
either validate or invalidate the DNR order, regardless of whether there is parental 
consent.  If the judge does not find the minor to be sufficiently mature to initiate an 
order, and the parents refuse to consent, the DNR order will be held invalid.  This 
statute will allow minor patients the autonomy they deserve, as well as protect 
physicians from liability in the event a parent consents, but the minor patient not. 
Based on West Virginia, New York, and Ohio’s current DNR laws, the 
framework for the amended statute would be as follows: 
§ 2133.27 DECISION MAKING ON BEHALF OF A MINOR PATIENT;  
A MINOR DEEMED SUFFICIENTLY MATURE TO INITIATE A DNR ORDER;  
MEDIATION AND JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEEDINGS 
1. A parent or legal guardian may consent to a do-not-resuscitate order on 
behalf of his or her minor child, provided that the attending physician 
makes a determination as to the medical condition of the minor, and a 
second physician concurs with the diagnosis. 
2. If a minor patient is deemed sufficiently mature and capable of 
understanding the nature and effect of a do not resuscitate order, and the 
minor patient wishes to initiate a DNR order, the minor may be 
permitted to initiate the order on his or her own behalf. 
3. In the event of a conflict between the wishes of the parents or legal 
guardian and the wishes of the minor patient, the attending physician 
                                                                
201See generally N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972. 
202See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972. 
203Id. 
204See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2973. 
205See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748.  See also In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d at 1185-86.  
(using criteria from both cases, these factors will allow an Ohio Court to make a 
determination). 
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will be required to refer the matter to the hospital’s dispute mediation 
program for a determination as to the minor patient’s maturity. 
4. Upon resolution of the mediation, the mediation board shall issue a 
legally binding decision, instructing the hospital to either issue a valid 
do not resuscitate order or to revoke the do not resuscitate order. 
5. If the dispute can not be resolved through mediation, either party may 
seek a timely judicial bypass proceeding, in which a judicial officer will 
review the facts, the recommendation of the mediation board, and the 
maturity of the minor patient, and make a determination as to whether a 
do not resuscitate order will be validated or revoked. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
“It is not too much to ask for a multi-faceted response from courts, Congress, 
and state legislatures to a newly recognized ethical dilemma in medicine.  Nor is it 
unrealistic.”206 
 
Unless we can differentiate degrees of dignity that should be accorded to adults 
and minors, DNR orders may allow minor patients a viable means for respecting 
their personal wishes.207  DNR orders should be available to all competent and 
capable patients, whether they are adults or minors.208  This idea is based on the fact 
that terminally ill minors are capable of making mature decisions involving their 
medical treatment, including initiating DNR orders.  Commentators Robert Weir and 
Charles Peters best state this notion: 
[Minors] have had, at the very least, multiple opportunities to think about 
the inescapable suffering that characterizes their lives, the features of life 
that make it worth continuing, the benefits and burdens that accompany 
medical treatment, and the prospect of death.  At least some of these 
adolescents want to give voice to their values, provide directions for 
parents, physicians, and nurses regarding end-of-life care, and be assured 
that their wishes and preferences will be respected and carried out should 
their medical conditions deteriorate to the point that they will no longer be 
able to communicate their deeply felt views.209  
The mature minor exception evolved as it became more evident that minors have 
healthcare rights, just as any adult does.  The common law presumption that minors 
are incapable of making their own decisions regarding medical treatment is slowly 
fading, and exceptions to this rule have been emerging.  Even though the medical 
and legal worlds have not yet made a steadfast rule regarding minors and medical 
treatment decisions, minors are gaining more rights with time.  In the future, more 
courts and legislatures will recognize the need for minors to be legally recognized as 
                                                                
206Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 119. 
207Hartman, supra note 9, at 1330 (citing Robert F. Weir and Charles Peters, Affirming the 
Decisions Adolescents Make About Life and Death, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 34 (1997)). 
208Robert F. Weir and Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents Make About 
Life and Death, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 34 (1997). 
209Id. 
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competent enough to make decisions regarding their own personal medical 
treatment.  This need to be recognized should also be extended to include a right to 
initiate a DNR order if the minor is deemed significantly mature. 
Combining the material discussed and referring back to the ethical scenario 
discussed in the introduction results in one question: what should be done?  To 
recall, the scenario involved a seventeen-year-old, cystic fibrosis patient who wished 
to initiate a DNR order but her parents were refusing to consent on her behalf.  
Perhaps more information should be included, in order to make an informed 
decision.  Assuming there was an attached medical definition of cystic fibrosis, 
which stated that cystic fibrosis is a disease with a poor prognosis.210  The disease 
attacks the endocrine glands of infants, children, adolescents and young adults, 
resulting in pancreatic insufficiency, chronic pulmonary disease, and in some cases, 
cirrhosis of the liver.211  Knowing that this patient has suffered her entire life with 
this disease, and that she is aware of the medical treatment options available, all of 
which are extremely painful and none of which offer a guaranteed cure. Furthermore, 
the patient understands the risks involved in resuscitation and the pain that is 
involved.  Should she now be permitted to initiate a DNR order?  What if the patient 
is an honor student, involved in school leadership activities, and planned on 
attending college on a full academic scholarship?  Would she be deemed sufficiently 
mature and then be permitted to initiate a DNR order on her own behalf? 
Under the proposed exception to Ohio’s current DNR law, all of these factors 
would be examined in order to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a minor 
is sufficiently mature to make his or her own decision regarding a DNR order.  
Looking at the original facts, it is apparent that more information would be needed to 
make an informed decision.  However, unless the law in Ohio is amended to allow 
this young woman autonomy in making her decision, she may be forced to suffer for 
as long as she remains alive, or until her parents determine for her what is in her best 
interests. 
ALLISON MANTZ 
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